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Nowadays  we  are  living  in  the  golden  age  of  involuntary  dissolutions  of 
companies  .  Starting  from  the  liquidations’  statistics,  the  role  of  the 
reorganization keeps growing. Its important to say, that the crisis management 
processes mostly cannot be solved indoors, the active assistance of the creditors is 
necessary. The regulated crisis management supported by law, which is to the 
debtor company’s advantage doesn’t operate satisfactory because of the special 
environment  of  the  creditors,  and  because  of  their  usually  subjective,  multi-
coloured and controversial type of behavior.  
1 The creditors’ role during the reorganization process 
The essential part of the reorganization process are the creditors. Considering that 
the  further  operating  of  the  debtor  corporation  is  the  main  condition  of  the 
reorganization, it is needed that its work by means of the creditors’ patience and 
concession  is  guaranteed.  The  escape  from  the  crisis  is  namely  unimaginable 
without  participating  further  sources.  Among  the  creditors’  authorizations  the 
reorganization is threatened by the fact that according to the operating legislation, 
if the debtor don’t fulfil or dispute his acknowledged or non-disputed contractual 
liability in 15 days after the contract expires and nor he fulfil it after the creditor 
written  request  for  payment,  the  creditor  is  entitled  to  file  a  petition  to  the 
competent court to initiate the liquidation process. The final order for starting the 
process blocks the crisis management. At the same time we must mention that the 
creditors  are  not  interested  in  the  liquidation  from  the  point  of  the  refund  of 
demand. Every year thousands of companies get under liquidation process, most 
of them entirely propertyless. [1] 
Because of the debtor enterprises’ financial condition the 90 % of the liquidation 
processes  are  simplified  processes,  on  the  other  hand  the  creditors’claims  are 
rarely settled, only the 2,8 %1 of the claims are refunded (based on other sources 
                                                            
1 Based on my own research in Gyır-Moson-Sopron county this percent can be lower). It involves if the firm is recoverable, the creditors – 
theoretically – should prefer the reorganization to the liquidation. While the crisis 
management  can  mean  the  survival  for  the  debtors,  for  the  creditors  their 
claims’return. Their goals are theoretically the same: to save the debtor company, 
which  is  in  an  economical  crisis.  But  the  creditors’  decisions  are  far  not  so 
definite.  
2 Working out a theoretical model 
Within  the  scope  of  bankruptcy  proceeding  conducted  reorganization  can  be 
considered as a special situation, as the creditors not the management of the firm 
have the right to decide on the debtor company’s fate about their own opinions, 
decisions and informations. [2] If we want to study the deforming effect of the 
subjective  factors  within  the  creditors’  decisions  we  will  need  an  objective, 
theoretical model. At a company the reorganization process can be considered in 
two steps along two questions.  
1.  Was the company salvable? 
2.  Was the reorganization successful? 
The first question is a sort of situation report: it examines the depth of the crisis 
and considers from economical point of view if it was worth to do anything and 
were the negative processes reversible. The second question is about the quality of 
the crisis management. While the first question is a decidable question, the second 
is accessible from many ways. To simplify, I consider that procedure successful, 
which finishes with the long-lasting recovery of the firm.  
The first illustration examines the company’s future as a function of the answers. 
Logically  a  crisis  management  cannot  be  successful  if  the  firm  is  terminated. 
There can be only three results of the crisis management procedure: 
 
  was the company salvable? 
    yes  no 




no  terminate  terminate 
1.illustration (own editing) 
The theoretical model of the reorganizational decisions The first illustration shows that the firms' survival can be guaranteed only if the 
crisis stays at a manageable level and the reorganization is successful. The model 
shows besides that logically there cannot be a situation when the company cannot 
be saved but the reorganization is prosperous.  
3. Creditors’ decisions during the bankruptcy 
proceeding 
The essential goal of the bankruptcy proceeding is to help the debtor to solve his 
payment  difficulties  through  an  agreement  with  the  creditors.  The  greatest 
advantage  of  the  bankruptcy  proceeding  in  contradiction  to  the  non-regulated 
reorganization, that from the beginning date of the procedure – namely from that 
date  when  the  application  for  the  procedure  arrives  at  the  court  –  until  the 
bankruptcy proceeding finishes liquidation and consummation cannot be initiated 
and most of the running procedures are suspended. The commence of the legally 
regulated reorganization is important for the debtor for the following reason too, 
because if during the procedure the court adjudicate a respite of payment the legal 
consequences of non-payment or postpayment won’t come into force. During the 
bankruptcy proceeding there is at least two negotiations with the creditors. On the 
first negotiation the creditors decide if they agree with giving the 90 days respite 
of payment according to the Bankruptcy Law. The moratorium is the essential part 
of the bankruptcy proceeding: the debtor don’t have to pay
2 his payable debts for 
90  days  so  he  has  time  to  work  out  a  reorganization  plan  which  helps  to  get 
straight. [3] 
So according to the prevailing law the moratorium is not assured automatically, a 
definite part of the creditors must agree. The agreement is guaranteed only if at the 
beginning of the procedure the simply majority of the overdued claims’ owner and 
the quarter of the unexpired claims’ owner contribute the debtor to make use of 
the respite of payment, presuming that these creditors’ entire demand reaches the 
2/3 of the creditor’s entire demands that appears in the debtor’s books. [4] 
During the moratorium the debtor tries to agree with the creditors based on the 
reorganization  program,  agreement  recommendations  and  the  related 
consummation plans. The goal of the debtor is to convince the creditors that as a 
result of a substancial detailed situation analysis he is able to save the company for 
a longer period. 
                                                            
2 The moratorium doesn’t affect all debts of the debtor. In the 12 §. of the Bankruptcy Law 
there is a list of claims that don’t belong to the moratorium: for example the claims based 
on employment relation, contributions, allowances, canal tolls, water-rates.  The decision levels at the bankruptcy proceeding are formally in accordance with 
the  questions  which  were  asked  in  our  theoretical  model.  In  the  first  step  the 
debtors decide if the reorganization is worth in their opinion, namely: is the debtor 
able to recover? In the second step they analyse the reorganization program and 
the agreement recommendation submitted by the debtor, they namely qualify the 
reorganization.  
Though  we  must emphasize  that the creditors don’t  have and cannot have the 
adequate answers because of their external role.  
It excel that during the bankruptcy proceeding the creditors decide in accordance 
with the question of the theoretical model. If the creditor’s legally regulated part 
decides that the company is salvable, namely the crisis is returnable, the debtor 
gets the respite of payment and if they find the reorganization plan worked out 
during the period of the respite of payment satisfactory the crisis management can 
be considered as a success.  
After filing an instance for bankruptcy proceeding according to the prevailing law 
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1. graph (own editing) 
The theoretical results of the bankruptcy proceeding 
If the company concerned by bankruptcy procedure after any consequences of the 
process is ceased or it continues in business can be showed through the ruling of 
the  liquidation  (as  a  form  of  termination).  The  second  gaph  showes  the 
proceedings among the yearly published bankruptcy proceeding which finished 
with  liquidation  breaking  down  by  their  results.  (The  numbers  in  the  brackets 
show the total amount of the bankruptcy proceedings belonging to every single 
year and their consequences.)  
Bankruptcy 
proceeding  finished 
with agreement 
Terminated after 




respite of payment 
2003  2          (7)  8          (8)  2          (5) 
2004  1          (4)  8          (9)  7          (9) 
2005  0          (3)  8          (10)  7          (10) 
Relation  of 
liquidation 
17,6%  89%  67% 
2. graph (own editing) 
The „real” results of the bankruptcy proceeding  
From the datas of the graph appears that a part of the firms which has conducted a 
successful bankruptcy proceeding are terminated with liquidation too. But its true 
though that among the bankruptcy processes published in 2005 – which – were 
finished later with creditor’s agreement – not any has been liquidated, but that can 
be a result of the relatively short period that elapsed since this study had been 
finished3. Moreover the datas show that every business corporations which didn’t 
get  respite  of  payment  (and  so  the  bankruptcy  proceeding  wasn’t  successful) 
weren’t liquidated, only the 67 % of them. In the remaining 33% the companies 
survived.  
So  our  gap  can  be  completed  with  another  column,  we  need  to  examine  the 
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3. graph (own editing) 
The theoretical and practical results of the bankruptcy proceeding 
                                                            
3 The study has been finished in March 2005 The debtor enterprise therefore – in opposite to the theoretical results of the 
decisions – can survive even though that most of the creditors adjudge that 
the company is not salvable and can be ceased with liquidation even though 
the necessary part of the creditors  considers the reorganization successful.  
The difference between the theoretical and the practical consequences is due to 
partly the absence of information that characterize the decisional situation of a 
creditor  and  partly  to  the  subjectivity  that  comes  from  a  distrust  which  is  an 
essential characteristic of the creditors.  
If we study every factor of the creditors’ decisions – based on empiric datas – we 
can explain our model results which were inconceivable theoretically. Namely: 
there can be cases when the legally necessary part of the decision-makers judge 
that  a  company  cannot  survive,  and  after  all  it  can  conduct  a  successful 
reorganization. [3] 
It can happen obviously because of two things: 1. the crisis was not real at all (in 
my opinion this is very unusual) 2. an external condition solves the problem, the 
creditors are dealing with it. Because of that the bankruptcy proceedings are rarely 
successful. 
Resume 
In  the  disfunctional  operating  of  the  institution  of  the  bankruptcy  there  is  a 
important role of the creditors’ decisions and their anomalies. While the  main 
motivation  of  the  creditors  by  the  decisions  connected  with  the  reorganization 
proceedings is to collect on their debts, they decide against the reorganization and 
it  is  because  they  rely  on  the  one  hand  on  their  incomplete  informations  in 
connection with the debtor company, on the other hand on their own feelings and 
impressions that if they decide against the reorganization there can be an external 
impact  that  solves  the  crisis  or  they  trust  that  the  demands  of  the  „obstinate” 
minority may be refunded to save the bankruptcy procedure. The anticipations of 
the creditors for the further status of the debtor firm are different of necessity. 
Based  on  the  strongly  proportioned  interests  of  the  creditors  the  chance  of  a 
successfully conducted reorganization proceeding is very minimal in advance.  
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